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The following essay is a survey of uses of hinge propositions in 
epistemological theories. I shall begin by looking at the sceptical paradox 
which is the main antagonist in Epistemology. I will then move on to look 
at the origins of the idea of hinge propositions, which had their root in 
late Wittgenstein. Finally I shall look at the two most prominent modern 
theories utilizing hinges; those of Crispin Wright and Michael Williams. 
In addition, I shall cover some of the main problems concerning these 
theories, and some brief possible responses.
 1.0 The Sceptical Paradox
There are many forms of the sceptical hypothesis (SH), but perhaps the 
most common, is the BIV argument:
(1) It is possible that I might be a BIV being fed all my ‘experiences’ 
of the world. 
(2) It is impossible definitively to determine that I am not a BIV. 
(3) If I cannot definitively determine that I am not a BIV, then most, 
if not all, of my beliefs lack sufficient epistemic status. 
Hence: 
(C) Most, if not all, of my beliefs lack sufficient epistemic status.
What we see as a consequence of the sceptical argument is the 
incompatibility of these three claims:
(S1) We cannot know the refutations of SH
(S2) If we are unable to know the refutations of SH, then it follows that 
we do not know ‘everyday’ propositions.  
(S3) ‘Everyday’ propositions are impossible to know
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Following from (S2), knowledge is ‘closed’ under known entailment. 
Primarily known as the closure principle:
Closure for Knowledge: For all agents,    ,    , if an agent knows a 
proposition    , and knows that    entails a second proposition     , then 
that agent also knows    .  
However, because closure permits (S2), it allows the sceptic to deny 
(S3) on the basis of (S1). The main force of this argument, which I wish 
to convey, is that due to the sceptic, we are unable to know everyday 
propositions. 
1.1 Origin of Hinge Propositions
The idea of hinge propositions was originally published in Wittgenstein’s 
final book, On Certainty, as a response to Moore’s objection to 
scepticism:
(1) I know that I have two hands. 
(2) If I know that I have two hands, then I know that there is an 
external world. 
Hence: 
(C) I know that there is an external world
Wittgenstein, drawing much from Hume, formed the idea of ‘hinge 
propositions’, in which there are particular propositions that one may 
believe but in addition, one may exempt from doubt. It is the belief in 
these particular propositions that enables one to begin one’s scientific 
investigations. They are not supported by reasons. The propositions are 
indeed the framework on which such investigations begin. For, ‘If I want 
the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.’ The sceptic, then, mistakes 
a hinge proposition for a normal (non-hinge) proposition, when she 
asks for reasons or justification. Taken in this light, hinge propositions 
can be considered to be propositions which one does not have direct 
grounds to believe, though they are believed, nevertheless because of 
their important role in scientific investigations or methodology. In Peter 
Strawson’s words:
The correct way [of dealing with] with the professional skeptical doubt 
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is not to attempt to rebut it with argument, but to point out that it is 
idle, unreal, a pretence; and then the rebutting arguments will appear 
as equally idle; the reasons produced in those arguments to justify [our 
beliefs ...] are not, and do not become, our reasons for these beliefs; there 
is no such thing as the reasons for which we hold these beliefs. [...] We 
simply cannot help accepting them as defining the areas within which 
the questions come up of what beliefs we should rationally hold on 
such-and-such a matter. 
The concept of a hinge proposition entails, for Moore, that he (perhaps 
like the sceptic) mistakes a hinge proposition for a proposition that is 
empirical. More explicitly: in claiming to know P, subject S implies that 
empirical grounds can be offered in support of P, and this justification 
is more certain than P. However, since there is no empirical evidence for 
Hinge Propositions, there can be no justification in resting on them.
Wittgenstein argues, then, for the revision of our understanding of the 
structure of reasons and empirical evidence, consequently implying 
that an assertion of a hinge proposition in the first-person is not 
conversationally apposite. This shows parallels to foundationalist 
epistemology, because the foundations of hinge epistemology are both 
self-justifying and not justified by anything else believed by a subject. 
Importantly, this also entails that doubts of hinge propositions are 
groundless, which means both the Moorean and the sceptic are misled 
by their claim to know and doubt, respectively, hinge propositions.
I have been dealing primarily with a minimalist interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on hinge propositions, and, for the anti-sceptic 
to denounce the sceptic, a strong thesis of epistemological hinge 
propositions must be constructed for three reasons:
1) the minimal thesis tells us next to nothing about what the 
conditions for knowledge are, focusing instead on what the appropriate 
conditions are for claims to know (or claims to doubt).
2) the minimal interpretation of On Certainty, if understood as an 
anti-sceptical thesis, makes the mistake […] of treating the sceptic as an 
embodied adversary, someone who is committed to making appropriate 
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claims about their epistemic position (and ours).
3) the minimal interpretation seems to favour a sceptical reading of 
our epistemic predicament over an anti-sceptical reading. 
From here, I shall take these reasons into consideration and in section 2 
move onto the more modern utilizations of hinge propositions.
2.0 Modern Hinge Theories
Under Richard Miller’s interpretation of hinge propositions, ‘epistemic 
rationality’—or one’s rationality that allows for the most advantageous 
number of true beliefs—and hinge propositions can be used 
interchangeably. Thus, to believe in certain propositions may enable 
an individual to optimize their number of true beliefs even though 
the beliefs may not have reasons. Therefore, one can believe in a hinge 
proposition, which is groundless, but nevertheless, allows the individual 
optimal true beliefs. Miller’s argument may be summarized as follows:
1) There are no grounds to support hinge propositions and we are 
compelled to believe them
2) Belief in hinge propositions is necessary for true beliefs. Hinge 
propositions are “epistemically indispensable resources”.
3) Belief in hinge propositions are not detrimental in any form 
because belief in them involves no cognitive apprehension, and thus 
trust in them cannot lead away from a belief.  No new evidence can 
count for or against a hinge proposition.
Therefore, it is epistemically rational to believe in hinge propositions,
This theory faces a number of problems though, the most difficult of 
which is that the sceptic can simply propose an epistemic reality which 
does not entail belief in hinge propositions. 
2.1 Wright’s Theory
The subversion argument may be able to be saved, though, by Crispin 
Wright, whose anti-sceptical thesis originated from his arguments on 
‘McKinsey paradoxes’, which involve the incompatibility of first-
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person authority and semantic externalism . The logical structure of 
McKinsey paradoxes mirrors that of sceptical arguments, in that first 
person authority and externalism produce an implausible conclusion. 
The paradox moreover involves knowledge transfers across known 
entailments, which assume closure for knowledge. Wright argues 
that closure cannot be rejected, but rather rejects a similar principle of 
‘transmission’. Closure simply holds that knowledge transfers across 
known entailments, where transmission is stronger, insisting that ‘what 
grounds the agent’s knowledge of the antecedent proposition thereby 
grounds the agent’s knowledge of the consequent proposition’ . Closure 
does not demand the same kind of stress on the antecedent proposition. 
Wright summarizes the point as follows:
A valid argument is one thing. A valid argument with warranted premises 
is a second. But a cogent argument is yet a third: it is an argument, roughly, 
whereby someone could/should be moved to rational conviction of the 
truth of its conclusion—a case where it is possible to learn of the truth of 
a conclusion by getting warrant for the premises and then reasoning to it 
by the steps involved in the argument in question. Thus a valid argument 
with warranted premises cannot be cogent if the route to warrant for 
its premises goes—of necessity, or under the particular constraints of 
a given epistemic context—via a prior warrant for its conclusion. Such 
arguments, as we like to say, ‘beg the question’. Say that a particular 
warrant, w, transmits across a valid argument just in case the argument 
is cogent when w is the warrant for its premises .
Thus, one can be warranted in believing the antecedent proposition, 
without being warranted in believing the consequent; moreover, 
the grounds for belief in the antecedent with a known entailment to 
the consequent does not entail that there is a warranted belief in the 
consequent. This ultimately results in Wright’s proposal that there are 
hinge-like propositions that one is entitled to believe but for which one 
cannot suggest any evidence, which are specifically the anti-sceptical 
propositions.  Closure is not the problem here, but transmission of 
warrant. 
Why is it, however, that Wright is able to obtain this anti-sceptical 
conclusion rather than a sceptical conclusion that we cannot know 
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these hinge propositions, and if closure holds, then we know little, if 
anything? This regrettably is a difficult problem, though one can argue 
that even though hinge propositions have no grounds for our belief, we 
are warranted in believing them, as not believing in hinge propositions 
would result in most of our knowledge being called into question. 
Wright, though, is an epistemic internalist—‘adequate reflectively 
accessible supporting grounds are essential to the possession of warrant 
or knowledge (at least as regards propositions which, like hinge 
propositions, are not ‘‘self-justifying’’ in the way that foundational 
propositions are taken to be on the classical internalist picture—i.e., by 
being self-evident, or incorrigible, and so forth)’ .
We now see that unearned warrants, or those without supporting 
reasons, are the main problem for Wright, as according to internalists, 
those warrants are not genuine. Though Wright’s response is that there 
are reflectively accessible grounds to support such hinge propositions, 
these reflective grounds are not epistemic, and thus, via internalism, 
they are not warrants at all. Wright’s distinction between transmission 
and closure never contributes to the argument as according Wright’s 
argument ‘Knowledge is essentially to do with the possession of 
reflectively accessible reasons, and the structure of reasons is such that 
our believing is ultimately groundless’ . Thus, Wright’s theory is in danger 
of falling into a form of scepticism. In addition to these reservations 
about unearned warrants, I propose an additional reservation dealing 
with the structure of Wright’s argument. Wright asserts that we must 
have a warrant for the conclusion of an argument, where transmission 
is a problem, but says that this warrant comes from somewhere else, 
specifically hinge propositions. Firstly, looking for warrant outside of a 
philosophical argument, I think, is in some form endorsing externalism, 
for if one cannot internally reflect to obtain warrant, then the warrant 
must come from an external source. Secondly, as hinge propositions 
have no reasons to support them, could they in fact be externalist 
elements? Hinge propositions are notions of the external world which 
are unknowable to us, but none the less are important in reasoning. 
Finally, if indeed, Wright is resting on elements that are externalist in 
nature, one might ask who declares that the person in question has a 
warrant for his belief. If hinges do not have reasons for us to rest our 
philosophical inquiry on, then surely someone must declare that an 
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individual is warranted in believing this hinge proposition. Wright’s 
theory seems to rest on the subject, but would it also be important to ask 
whether an attributor would be in a better position?
Perhaps, what Wright needs is some justification for believing in 
hinge propositions beyond the mere assertion that, without them, 
our branching theories would fail to work properly. For example, in 
physics, there are many theories that have mathematically explained the 
workings of certain aspects of the universe (i.e. gravity) but which have 
been revised numerous times with the acquisition of new data. Thus, I 
believe it is not acceptable merely to stress that hinges are existent based 
on the problems we would encounter, were we not to believe in them. I 
will, though, set these thoughts aside, and move on to another epistemic 
theory utilizing hinge propositions. 
 
2.2 William’s Theory
Williams looks to rectify Wright’s problems by turning to an externalist 
view of hinge propositions, which also draws from newer inferential 
contextualism; which differs from subject contextualism (put forward 
by Keith DeRose) where the standards of knowledge are set by the 
conversational contexts of the attributor’s context, but rather the subject’s 
context sets the epistemic standards. In each context, there will be 
epistemic standards that cannot be challenged, and the rest of the beliefs 
in the epistemic context will be tested relative to the hinge propositions 
held in that particular context. However, Williams claims that different 
beliefs in different contexts play the role of a hinge proposition, which 
reflects movement between the epistemic contexts.
Williams’s thesis separates itself from other contextualist theories on 
these claims:
1) “Methodological Necessities” are held to be true in the want of 
any supporting grounds.
2) There is no ‘hierarchy’ of contexts.
Semantic contextualism generally states that sceptical hypotheses are 
more demanding then ‘normal’. However, Williams asserts that all 
contexts are separate from one another. A sceptical context has the hinges 
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of an assumption that knowledge is context invariant, i.e.: knowledge 
of the world is unattainable under philosophical investigation. Both 
of these claims appear controversial to me, as certainly necessity is 
always controversial in post Quinian philosophy, but more troubling is 
Williams’s lack of a hierarchy of contexts. Certainly there are contexts, 
such as a philosophical one or sceptical one, which are more pressing, 
and thus involve more justification or pedigree. Williams, though, retains 
closure: normal contexts allow subjects to know hinge propositions 
presupposed. However, the main problem faced by Williams here is 
one that plagued DeRose and Lewis as well, in which any mention of 
the hinge propositions changes the epistemic context to a philosophical 
one, in which different hinges would be found to hold. In the sceptical 
context, the Sceptical Hypothesis (SH) holds, though Williams claims 
that some anti-sceptic propositions are unattainable in sceptical contexts 
but he holds closure, allowing for these propositions to be known in 
normal contexts. Thus a subject can have normal knowledge and have 
knowledge of denials of SH.
 Williams’s thesis, though, has more problems: most notably 
perhaps is the fact that subjects know tacitly the context’s hinges due 
to the externalist nature of the thesis. Moreover, Williams is moving to 
reject epistemological realism, but merely asserts that it is ambiguous. 
According to Williams, realism is embedded in sceptical contexts, and 
thus we should ignore the sceptical context all together. In the sceptical 
context there is not only a lack of justification, but also there is a case 
for beliefs to be false. However in the normal contexts, only the former 
holds. However, Williams, at times, wants to hold that there are true 
conclusions relative to a sceptical context. 
 Williams’s problems with his theory, namely the problem of not 
being able to assert one’s knowledge (which is the same problem plaguing 
other forms of contextualism), leads me to believe that the incorrect move, 
for Williams, was to endorse contextualism. However, Subject Sensitive 
Invariantism does not deal with the sceptical problem very well, I feel 
perhaps an SSI theory that introduces hinge propositions may prove 
more effective. In SSI, one’s warrant for belief changes with context, 
instead of one’s knowledge. Thus, perhaps we can have knowledge of 
many things, however warrant changes with the context, diminishing 
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the amount of things we know in more challenging contexts (perhaps 
representing the further one goes from the basic hinge propositions). In 
other words, the closer to basic hinges we are, the more warrant we have 
for believing a proposition, but the more or complex the belief, the more 
warrant needed, as it is further from the hinge. 
 This essay has merely been a survey of the recent work in 
epistemological discipline on hinge theories. All I have attempted to 
show is that the modern theories do in fact face many problems, but 
there, perhaps, is hope to challenge the sceptic by combining the hinge 
theories with other modern disciplines in epistemology, such as Subject 
Sensitive Invariantism, or other forms of Contextualism.
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